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Abstrat
Although many key reovery mehanisms have been proposed, the
majority of them have been designed in the ontext of use with om-
muniated data. The dierent requirements, however, that surround
ommuniated and arhived data make most of these mehanisms in-
appropriate for use on arhived data. This paper investigates the busi-
ness need for key reovery for enrypted arhived data, identies the
requirements a key reovery mehanism should full, and proposes a
sheme where keys used for stored data enryption an easily be re-
overed.
Keywords: key reovery, smart ards, arhived data, rogue user
attaks, business requirements.
1 Introdution
With the development of ryptography and its growing use in proteting
ommuniated and arhived data, a ritial issue has evolved onerning the
loss of deryption keys. Assuming the use of seure mehanisms, loss of

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keys means that deryption is infeasible, resulting in inaessibility of data.
Corporations will nd suh situations unaeptable, espeially if the inaes-
sible data hold potentially valuable information. Key reovery mehanisms
(KRMs) an be an eient ountermeasure to this threat. KRMs are meh-
anisms that allow authorised parties, under ertain onditions, to retrieve
the ryptographi keys used for data ondentiality, with the ultimate goal
of reovering the leartext data. An introdution to how these mehanisms
work, and desriptions of existing KRMs and their properties, an be found
in [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6℄.
The KRMs proposed so far have mainly been designed to provide key
reovery (KR) for enrypted ommuniation sessions. However, the dierent
requirements for KRMs for ommuniated and arhived data [7℄ demand the
distintion between these two types of appliation. This paper examines the
requirements that a KRM should full when deployed for enrypted arhived
data in a orporate environment. Further to this analysis, a mehanism is
proposed that meets these needs. More speially, the mehanism gives
authorised parties the ability to reover keys used for enrypting arhived
data with limited storage and proessing requirements while preventing rogue
user attaks. Unlike most KRMs, eah user will be able to reover the keys
used on the les he enrypted without the intervention of the key reovery
agent (KRA), i.e. the trusted entity that assists in the reovery of keys, by
preserving the appropriate key material.
2 The need for KR for enrypted arhived data
The enryption of arhived data typially involves a single entity, whih stores
and retrieves data at distint points in time [7℄. Unless omplex key gener-
ation tehniques giving a third party aess to the generated key material
are used, the entity that does the enryption is likely to be the only one in
possession of the key material needed to derypt the data. As a result, there
are many irumstanes that an result in the loss or inaessibility of keys.
These irumstanes inlude both deliberate ations and aidents.
Deliberate ations originate both from outsiders and insiders. Experiene
seems to show that attaks are more likely to ome from insiders than out-
siders [8, 9℄, and hene the threat to the ompany from its employees annot
be ignored when enforing seurity in a orporate environment. One of the
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dangers that a ompany might fae is a disgruntled employee being the only
holder of the keys used to derypt business information. When requested to
hand over the deryption keys, e.g. on termination of employment, he might
refuse to do so, leaving the ompany with the potentially infeasible task of
retrieving enrypted data without having the deryption key.
There are also ertain aidental situations whih might have the same
unaeptable result. Consider, for instane, an employee that is away on va-
ation when the ompany requires the keys for the deryption of some of his
data. Requesting the employee to reveal the password over an inseure tele-
phone link, subjet to eavesdropping, bears the risk of aidentally revealing
it to unauthorised third parties. Under these onditions there should be an
alternative means for the ompany to gain aess to the keys neessary for
deryption.
When keys are held in a storage devie, e.g. a hard disk or a smart ard,
aessible by a password, the possibility exists that the devie is destroyed,
malfuntions, or is lost (not unlikely in the ase of smart ards). The stored
keys would then beome inaessible and, if a mehanism that allows reovery
of the keys kept in the devie does not exist, the data would be lost.
All these undesirable situations imply that the orporation, as the legiti-
mate owner of all the ompany data, should have aess to data deryption
keys when neessary. KRMs an help overome this problem, sine they
provide a means to aess the key material neessary to reover the data de-
ryption keys. This aess will typially only be given to authorised entities,
ating in aordane with a dened orporate seurity poliy.
Although key reovery an be used as a ountermeasure to the above
threats, it an also be used to enourage employees to use enryption. Unless
they are sure that data they enrypt an be easily reovered even if they lose
the deryption keys, employees will be relutant to use enryption, hene
leaving their data unenrypted even though that information needs to be
proteted. Note that this paper does not attempt a detailed analysis of the
various lasses of KRMs; instead see [1℄ and [2℄.
3 Using existing KRMs with arhived data
Previously proposed KRMs were mainly designed to provide KR funtional-
ity for enrypted ommuniations. When these mehanisms are applied to
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arhived data (espeially key enapsulation shemes [2, 6℄), they suer from
the absene of a seond party that an verify the generated KR information.
As a result, they beome partiularly vulnerable to rogue user attaks, where
a rogue user an tamper with (alter or delete) the KR information during or
after its generation, making it unusable to third parties.
An obvious ountermeasure to this attak is to have an on-line agent
whih will ontribute to the generation of all data enryption keys, while
having diret aess to, and keeping a bakup of, all the generated keys.
Alternatively, users ould be required to esrow their master key or the
le enrypting keys with a entral agent. These solutions, however, typi-
ally demand a high-powered on-line server that may be involved in the key
generation proess, and its unavailability would prevent use of enryption.
Furthermore, the administrative osts involved, inluding the seurity meh-
anisms needed for the protetion of this information and the storage needs of
all the esrowed keys, may make this solution quite unattrative, espeially
in small and medium-sized enterprises.
Another problem with most existing KRMs is that they do not oer the
user who performed the enryption the ability to reover his keys unaided.
That is, every time the user wants to reover a key previously used for en-
rypting data, he has to ontat his agent, who will reover the required
keys on the user's behalf. This problem arises from the fat that the inten-
tion of the majority of the proposed mehanisms was to give KRAs aess
to suspeted enrypted ommuniated data. So the design was foused on
giving aess to the on-line agent, where the ommuniation hannel already
exists, rather than the user himself. As a result, applying these mehanisms
to enrypted arhived data introdues extra ommuniations osts, due to
the required agent's interation, and demands an on-line agent with the on-
sequenes mentioned above.
A key reovery mehanism that would be speially designed for use
with enrypted arhived data while overoming the aforementioned problems
should typially satisfy the following requirements:
1. The KRA should have the ability to reover the required keys, even
when the user tampers with the generated KR information.
2. The mehanism should give the user the ability to reover his keys
unaided, i.e. without the KRA's intervention. This will ensure that the
user has ontinuous aess to his keys while avoiding the need to keep
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a bakup of them loally (an approah that introdues new threats to
the serey of the keys).
Further to these requirements, it will be an advantage if the KRM makes
no demands for an on-line server or storage of users' key related material.
A KRM designed for use with arhived data was proposed by Maher, [10℄.
This mehanism, however, suers from the problem that a user an tamper
with the generated key reovery information and prevent key reovery by
the agent. Moreover, the user annot reover his keys without the agent's
partiipation, a property that either neessitates the use of bakup opies of
keys or relies on the KRA's ative support to aess enrypted data.
Another sheme is proposed here that overomes this problem. More
speially, for the proposed KRM a user does not require his agent's inter-
vention to reover his keys. Further, it is not vulnerable to rogue user attaks
on the generated KR information, and has no requirement for generated keys
to be esrowed with the agent. Therefore, the proposed mehanism avoids
both the vulnerability to rogue user attaks of key enapsulation mehanisms,
and the requirement for storage and protetion of user key material of key
esrow mehanisms.
As far as rogue user attaks are onerned, for the purposes of this pa-
per we assume that a rogue user, trying to disable authorised KR by his
assoiated KRA, may tamper with the generated KR information by either
altering or deleting it, or may even prevent its generation. However, we as-
sume that the user will leave the enrypted data unhanged so that he an
reover it when neessary (if the enrypted data is modied or destroyed,
then no KRM an deal with the situation). For instane, the rogue user
might simply detah the KR information from the enrypted le, whih he
will retain but not hand to the KRA. Through possession of this information
the user an reover the required key, but the KRA annot. Finally, note
that no KRM an prevent a rogue user from deploying his own ryptographi
infrastruture, and hene, suh rogue user attaks are not onsidered in this
paper.
4 A new KRM for enrypted arhived data
We now desribe the new mehanism for adding KR funtionality to the
enryption proess for arhived data.
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Three entities are involved in the proposed mehanism: the user who
enrypts the data, the KRA whih assists in the management of keys, and
the authorised entity AE whih is the entity authorised by the orporate
poliy to have aess to users' data.
Whenever a user wants to enrypt a le or message, instead of generating
a random key for data enryption, he uses the proposed mehanism for key
generation, whih will also allow later reovery of the generated key. For
this mehanism, whih neessitates the use of a smart ard by eah user, the
following requirements must be satised:
1. The KRA and the user's ard share a message authentiation ode
(MAC) funtion f1, a one-way hash funtion h, and a key generat-
ing funtion f2 (this ould potentially be a one-way hash funtion). f2
is used to generate the key K
AC
that will be used by the MAC funtion
f1, i.e. K
AC
= f2(K
M
; id
A
), where K
M
is the KRA's master key and
id
A
is user's A identity. K
AC
should be stored on the user's ard, typ-
ially during the ard's personalisation, while the user must not have
aess to it to prevent rogue user attaks.
2. The KRA, user, and authorised entity share a key generating funtion
f3. As with f2, f3 an be a one-way hash funtion.
3. The user's ard and the AE share a seret key K
AM
whih is generated
as a funtion of K
A
and a seret master key K
AE
that the authorised
entity possesses, i.e. K
AM
= f3(K
AE
; K
A
). K
A
is a master key spei
to user A, whih is generated as a funtion of KRA's key K
M
and the
user's identity id
A
, i.e. K
A
= f3(K
M
; id
A
). As with K
AC
, K
AM
should
also be stored on the user's ard during the ard's personalisation.
4. The user has aess to a random number generator. The generated
random numbers are used to ensure key freshness so that even a single
le will not be enrypted with the same key more than one.
5. The KRA administers a le onsisting of indexes binding a unique
le identier with a random value generated for the spei le. The
integrity of this le and must be preserved.
6. All the entities trust the devie where the enryption takes plae, i.e.
the user's PC or a server. If this is not the ase then enryption has to
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take plae on the ard, although there are ertain performane limita-
tions assoiated with this approah.
When user A wants to enrypt a le, a session key K
S
has to be generated
using the following protool.
1. A generates a random value RAND either on his ard or on the PC and
using his ard omputes a MAC on RAND and the unique identier
leid of the le to be enrypted, i.e. MAC
1
= f1
K
AC
(RAND; leid). A
then sends the following message to the KRA,
A
idA k RAND k leid k MAC
1
                         ! KRA
where k denotes onatenation.
2. Upon reeipt of the message the KRA uses the reeived user's iden-
tity id
A
and the master key K
M
to ompute the key K
AC
. The KRA
then reomputes the message authentiation ode MAC
1
using the re-
eived values RAND and leid and heks the result against the re-
eived MAC
1
. If the hek sueeds the KRA adds an entry to the
index le onsisting of the reeived leid and the random value RAND,
indexed by the user who sent it. The KRA then omputes a message
authentiation ode MAC
2
on the hash of values RAND and leid, i.e.
MAC
2
= f1
K
AC
(h(RAND; leid)) and sends it bak to the user's ard.
A
MAC
2
          KRA
This tells the ard that the KRA has suessfully registered the reeived
random value RAND for the le identied by leid.
3. As soon as the ard reeives MAC
2
it reomputes it using the values
RAND and leid that it sent to the KRA, and heks it against the
reeived MAC
2
. (Note that the omputation of MAC
2
ould take plae
while the ard waits for the KRA's response.) If the hek sueeds, the
ard uses the seret key K
AM
and the random value RAND to generate
the session key K
S
as
K
S
= f3(K
AM
;RAND)
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whih is passed to the PC for the enryption proess. The le is en-
rypted using K
S
and a key reovery eld KRF is attahed to it. The
KRF onsists of the random value RAND (the KRA's identity should
also be inluded if there are multiple KRAs), i.e.
KRF = fRANDg
Should an emergeny aess situation arise, the authorised entity will re-
quest from the KRA the key K
A
that orresponds to the user that performed
the enryption. Having K
A
and using the master key K
AE
and the funtion
f3 the authorised entity omputes the orresponding user's key K
AM
, i.e.
K
AM
= f3(K
AE
; K
A
). Using K
AM
and the value RAND attahed to the le,
the authorised entity an suessfully reover the required key and the target
data.
5 Properties and seurity analysis
With the proposed sheme, there is no need for interation with the agent in
everyday user aess to the enrypted data, a property that simplies the key
reovery proess for the user. More speially, when a user wants to aess
a key that he has previously used to enrypt arhived data, the agent need
not partiipate in this proess. The user is able to reover the keys using his
smart ard, whih an reompute the target key K
S
using the value RAND
attahed to the le.
The majority of KRMs lak suh a feature; the user's KRA is typially
the only entity that an reover the key. With the proposed sheme the user
will be required to ontat his agent only if he has lost his ard, in whih
ase only the authorised entity AE an reover the user's keys. This property
typially eliminates the requirement for an on-line agent for the reovery of
keys (for the purposes of user everyday aess to enrypted data) and avoids
the related ommuniations overhead. Moreover, the user does not have
to bak-up or arhive the generated keys for his own needs, thus avoiding
ertain problems assoiated with suh an approah. Further properties of
the proposed mehanism inlude:
1. The proposed mehanism is not vulnerable to rogue user attaks, as
even if a rogue user deletes the generated KRF the KRA has the means
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to reover the requested key. Using just the index le and the identity
of the le and the user, the KRA has all the needed values to ompute
the required key.
2. The KRA does not have to store or protet any of the user generated
keys, thus avoiding ertain problems that key esrow mehanisms fae,
e.g. protetion from unauthorised aess to the esrowed material. The
only requirement, apart from the protetion of the seret value K
M
, is
protetion of the index le from unauthorised modiation.
3. The mehanism benets from the separation of the KRA from the au-
thorised entity AE in that the KRA does not have aess to users'
generated session keys. The only entities that an reover the session
keys are the users and the authorised entity AE. This allows the orpo-
ration to outsoure the management of the KRM without endangering
the ondentiality of the orporate data.
4. Dispersion of key material, a ountermeasure that makes attaks on
key reovery mehanisms more diult, is properly enfored with the
use of both K
M
and K
AE
for the omputation of K
AM
and, therefore,
the generation of K
S
. Even ifK
M
or K
AE
is ompromised an adversary
annot gain aess to the users' keys. The attaker has to know both
K
M
and K
AE
to be able to reover users' keys.
5. The random value RAND an be either generated on the ard or on
the user's PC and passed to the ard. The seurity of the mehanism,
however, does not rely on the randomness of this value, sine it is only
used to ensure freshness of the generated key. As a result, RAND an
be generated on the PC to redue the number of power onsuming
proedures that take plae on the ard.
6 Conlusions
In this paper, the possible dangers to a orporation arising from an inability
to aess keys used for enrypting stored data have been onsidered. The
requirements for a KRM used as a ountermeasure have been identied and
a new mehanism that fulls them has been proposed. More speially,
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the mehanism is not vulnerable to rogue user attaks, unlike many existing
KRMs when used for enrypted arhived data, while it oers the user the
ability to reover his keys without his agent's intervention, a feature that
eliminates any ommuniation overheads. It has the additional benet that
it does not require the diret esrow of any user generated keys, avoiding the
osts introdued by the demand for protetion and administration of these
keys.
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